The U.S. Navy has released a report detailing the findings from the investigation into the collision of the USS Harry S. Truman with the merchant vessel Besiktas-M on February 12, 2023, near Port Said, Egypt. The report, made available on the Navy’s Freedom of Information Act Reading Room site, highlights critical human factors, including fatigue and poor seamanship, that contributed to the accident.
The investigation, initiated by Vice Adm. Jeffrey T. Anderson, commander of the U.S. 6th Fleet, began shortly after the incident. The report emphasizes that, although there were no fatalities, the situation could have resulted in a far more serious outcome. The USS Harry S. Truman, which was five months into its deployment, managed to continue its mission following the collision.
Among the significant findings, the report notes that crew members faced extreme fatigue due to inadequate sleep. According to Navy guidelines, watch teams should receive at least 7.5 hours of rest every 24-hour period. However, many crew members reported only getting two to four hours of sleep, often split between their two daily watches. The report described the watch schedule as “ugly,” highlighting that a rotation of six hours on and six hours off led to a total of 84 hours of watch time per week, significantly exceeding the Navy Manpower Analysis Center’s recommended limits.
Crew members also reported having to choose between eating and sleeping, with some consuming only one meal per day. The investigation revealed that those who claimed to obtain five to seven hours of sleep may have been overestimating their rest.
Key Findings and Recommendations
The report identified four primary causes for the collision. Firstly, the officer of the deck displayed poor seamanship by allowing the Truman to travel at a speed of 19 knots, which significantly impaired the ability to avoid a collision. The officer failed to assess the traffic density in the area and did not communicate effectively with the watchstanders regarding the navigational situation.
Secondly, the navigator of the Truman did not provide sufficient guidance to the officer of the deck or the watch teams, which hindered safe navigation during a critical transit period. Thirdly, the report noted deficiencies in bridge resource management, as the watch teams lacked the necessary training and experience to identify and correct errors.
Lastly, Capt. Dave Snowden, the Truman’s commanding officer at the time, was found to have “abdicated his responsibility” for safe navigation, leaving critical decisions to the navigator and officer of the deck. Following the incident, Capt. Snowden was relieved of his command.
The investigation also mentioned the inability to obtain information from the Besiktas-M crew, preventing a full assessment of the merchant vessel’s actions contributing to the collision. Nevertheless, the report indicated that the Besiktas-M did not maintain its course and speed, violating navigational rules.
The Navy’s findings led to several recommendations, including the creation of a crew endurance policy by the commander of Naval Air Forces. This policy would address watch rotation and meal schedules to improve crew well-being. Additionally, the report called for an assessment of operational tempos and emphasized the importance of risk assessment by command leaders.
Moreover, the investigation suggested developing training modules for commanding officers focused on managing fatigue, potentially using wearable technology to monitor sleep and performance, akin to practices in professional sports.
While the report included insights on potential outcomes had the situation been different, those sections were redacted. The findings serve as a reminder of the critical importance of effective crew management and operational safety in naval operations.
